The importance of the question in philosophy classes - by mediation, having the same as provocative principle, of learning

A importância da questão nas aulas de filosofia - por mediação, tendo o mesmo princípio provocativo, de aprender

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RESUMO
A pergunta revela a curiosidade, a busca pela informação, a construção e produção do conhecimento. É o desejo de querer conhecer, de penetrar no desconhecido. É o início do desmanche da dúvida, é admirar-se com uma realidade e é o “pontapé inicial” da Filosofia. “Por que?”, revela uma inquietude do sujeito, uma manifestação para sair da forma mais simples, do senso comum para um “estar aí”, para um desvelar, transformar, ir para além daquela forma “congelada” sobre tudo. É pensar de modo sistemático, organizado e metódico, é indagar, é atitude dinâmica, é ser intencional na razão e nos fatos da existência humana. A mediação é um processo dialético, de diálogo e que deve ter como instrumento a pergunta, e tendo como objetivo a aprendizagem do estudante. Neste percurso, o Professor deve propor “estratégias de tese, síntese (análise) e antítese” para construir uma nova tese, de forma espiral crescente, ao aprendente. A aprendizagem é a aquisição, através de mecanismos neurais, mentais, da inteligência, da memória, de produtos do conhecimento no indivíduo, sendo ele capaz de realizar, atuar no meio em que vive. Pense a pergunta nas aulas de Filosofia tem como objetivo mostrar esta atitude intelectual humana como instrumento que vai além da curiosidade da sala de aula. O papel do mediador, deve ser pensado, com o objetivo de balizar, é o equilíbrio provocante do aprendizado do aprendente. Para realização da revisão de literatura foram feitas buscas nos sites acadêmicos Scielo, Springer Link, e Refseek. Foram utilizados os seguintes descritores: aprendizagem, pergunta, mediador, Filosofia, inteligência e curiosidade. As buscas foram feitas tendo como fontes: artigos completos publicados em periódicos indexados na base de dados supracitados, livros, teses, dissertações, monografias e documentos oficiais dos Conselhos Nacional e Estadual de Educação, Secretaria de Educação e Ministério de Educação. Como principais resultados tem-se que o aprendizado é produto do relacionamento mediador-mediado, no sentido em que a pergunta deva servir de elemento significativo, instigante para o estudante.
ABSTRACT
The question reveals curiosity, the search for information, the construction and production of knowledge. It's the desire to want to know, to penetrate the unknown. It is the beginning of the dismantling of doubt, is to admire yourself with a reality and is the "kick-start" of Philosophy. "Why?" reveals an uneasiness of the subject, a manifestation to get out of form simpler common sense for a "being there", for an unenviable, transform, to go beyond that "frozen" way over everything. It is to think in a systematic, organized and methodical way, it is to wonder, it is a dynamic attitude, it is to be intentional in the reason and in the facts of human existence. Mediation is a dialectical process of dialogue that should aim at student learning. In this journey, the Professor must propose "strategies of thesis, synthesis (analysis) and antithesis" to build a new thesis, in an increasing spiral, to the learner. Learning is the acquisition, through neural, mental mechanisms, intelligence, memory, of knowledge products in the individual, being able to perform, act in the environment in which he lives. Thinking about the question in philosophy classes aims to show this human intellectual attitude as an instrument that goes beyond the curiosity of the classroom. The role of the mediator must be thought, with the objective of beacon, provocative balance of learning of the learner. To conduct the literature review, searches were made on the academic websites Scielo, Springer Link, and Refseek. The following descriptors were used: learning, question, mediator, philosophy, intelligence and curiosity. The searches were made based on: complete articles published in journals indexed in the aforementioned database, books, theses, dissertations, monographs and official documents of the National and State Councils of Education, Department of Education and Ministry of Education. As main results, learning is the product of the mediated relationship, in the sense that the question should serve as a significant, instigating element for the student.

Keywords: Learning, Question, Why?, Mediator, Philosophy, Curiosity and Intelligence.

1 INTRODUCTION
The question is the manifestation of the desire to subtraction the doubt, in which it disappears when the first is answered. In Philosophy, the beginning of the articulating process of thought occurs when the individual says: Why?. Thus, the beginning of the skeptical manifestation of the human being begins. In the context of the educational activity, it is noted that, to a large extent, studies focused on the act of educating are dedicated to methodological issues or even to a better productivity and performance in learning, as if only these aspects were priority in the education of children and young people. Do you care about issues like what do we educate for? or how should we educate?, often, without even asking ourselves: in the name of which we educate? What is the importance of the research problem, the guide questions, the elaboration of hypotheses in
the observation of phenomena? And finally, as the question as a provocative principle of meaningful human learning?

If the first question turns to something that is projected in the future, an end to the act of educating and the second to the means of doing so, this last question deals with something that precedes the educational activity itself, the principles in which we dedicate our efforts in the education of the new generations and which, fundamentally, attribute meaning to this task. Because, more than discussing and problematizing why "Joãozinho can not read", Arendt (2009, p. 221-247) deals with the responsibility that we assume – or not – in presenting the world to the new generations. For "it is through education that each community introduces the new generations in their specific mode of existence" (ALMEIDA, 2011, p. 20). Do we need to break through the barriers of traditional education? Can the teacher instigate the students to have autonomy? Who or what doesn't want teachers to promote critical and inquiring citizens?

The present work has as problem to verify the importance of the question in philosophy classes, having it as a provoking principle of learning. What is the importance of the question in philosophy classes? Is the question a provocative element in the mediating learning relationship? Does the question serve as a beacon of learning?

This research justifies the manifestation of the question as a provoking element of learning in philosophy classes. As reference authors we have: Paulo Freire, Paulo César Nodari, Silvia Zanatta, Philippe Perrenoud, Ani Bustamanti, Marcos Meier / Sandra Garcia, Nietzsche, Porchat, Sartre, Cerletti, Kohan and Marculino Camargo.

Show the importance of the question in philosophy classes and have it as a provoking element of learning in everyday school life.

2 METHODOLOGY

In addition to literary review, search sites such as: Scielo, Springer Link and Refseek were used, as well as books, articles, dissertations, theses and texts with thematic relevance published in the last five years.

3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

It is natural for a philosophy professor, who understands by philosophy the analysis of its logical constructions, to take a teaching practice different from that employed by a teacher of guidance that understands it as a result of a long historical-economic process. Now, if so, then we can only think about teaching philosophy if we
first answer the question: what is this – philosophy? Thus, if each conception of philosophy corresponds to an answer, perhaps the only possible answer is that suggested by Porchat, namely, "that it is not possible to offer a definitive answer to this question". So how to establish the guidelines for teaching philosophy?\(^1\)

It seems to us that the only alternative is to assume that the truth of philosophies cannot be fully covered and that, therefore, this non-place of philosophy is that it should guide the teaching of it. It seems to us, therefore, that the anti-dogmatism mentioned above is a basic prerogative to enter philosophical thought. This conception is in line with that image of the teacher "problematizer" and that instigates the students with "northing questions" proclaimed by Freire to which we allude.\(^2\)

The teacher is, first of all, the one who, from the experiences of the student, throws problems, investigations, questions and provocations to him. It encourages him to produce answers from a "creative research". If methodological skepticism proclaims that there is no place for absolute Truth, then it does not seem to us an abuse to adopt a dynamic conception of truth and, consequently, of philosophy. It does not seem absurd to assume the conflict of philosophies as yet another necessary prerogative.

Thus it is not for the teacher to teach philosophical truths, but rather to seek questions and answers in the philosophical tradition to the problems raised by the students themselves and updated to contemporary reality. There is a fundamental presupposition to the traditional pedagogical model which is that the teacher holds the truth, so he professes. If we start from a dynamic conception to the truth, then it makes no sense a model in which the teacher transmits his knowledge to the student.

Now, if we are not talking here about the transmission of knowledge, so as not to reduce the process to the transmission of information, what do we talk about then? That is why the expression we borrow from Porchat is important, we need to conceive of a philosophy class as a "creative research", as a collective process that seeks to answer the questions also collectively constructed.

However, this implies a series of fundamental changes in the daily practice of the philosophy teacher. Let us take Nietzsche's ideas as the motto at this point when he problematizes the problem of truth. In the author's famous text: On truth and lies in the extra-moral sense, the philosopher weaves severe criticism of the traditional

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\(^1\) PORCHAT, Oswaldo, The conflict of philosophies in: Philosophy and the common view of the world, p. 19.
\(^2\) FREIRE, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 29
philosophical framework with regard to truth, because, according to him, truth emerges as the necessary corollary of a so-like peaceful social life.\(^3\)

Thus, the genesis of our understanding of truth is language, which determines what we understand as truth or lie, thus the aversion to lies that the West has erected as a reference is due to the fact of the negative consequences that deception can bring to this model. Thus, truth must guarantee the stability of the current social model, and language functions as its instrument.

There is here a counterpoint between the real and its representation by language, so the real is coated and always reconstructed mediated by language. What is the truth, then? A mobile battalion of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relationships, which were emphasized poetically and rhetorically, transposed, adorned, and which, after long use, seem to a solid, canonical and obligatory people: truths are illusions, of which they have forgotten that they are, metaphors that have become worn and without sensitive force, coins that have lost their effigy and now only come into consideration as metal, no longer as coins.

Canons are established and truth is always the truth from a certain point of view, historically constructed and located. Here, although the small leap, we finally refer to the Sartorian conception of truth as a process and move on to the second part of our brief reflection: What is the role of the question, of the image, and more specifically, of metaphor as a mediator in the process of formation of students?

It is notorious the criticism that Sartre carries out the traditional conception of image. For the author, imaginative consciousness and perceptual consciousness are not confused, and this is because, in his understanding, it is necessary to understand consciousness as an act, this implies the refusal to any and all attempts to substantialize it. Thus, an object cannot in any way be in consciousness, because it asks and the mental image "is a certain way that the object has to appear to consciousness". In other words, the question and image is an act of consciousness when relating to the object. The problem raised here refers to the way consciousness operates by constituting the imaginary object. What questions can be cast as instigators in this process? What is a mental image? What is the distinction between image and perception? And most of all, what is the imaginary?\(^4\)

For Sartre, the whole philosophical tradition, with regard to the problem, the question, the mental image, tried to substantialize the consciousness, transforming it into

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\(^3\) NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Lies in the Sense Extra-moral, p. 48, § 1.
\(^4\) SARTRE, The Imaginary, p. 19.
a kind of receptacle populated by small simulacrum. In this sense, the image is nothing more than a smaller copy of the thing in consciousness, a content of and in consciousness, which necessarily implies a substantialistic conception.5

This comment seems pertinent because, for Sartre, consciousness exists as a pure act, as a relationship with the world. Or in the image used by the philosopher, consciousness is like a wind, an explosion toward something, but that is never in itself, never realized. Consciousness is pure relation to the world. It is then necessary to present what the philosopher understands by perception and what he means by problem, guide question, mental image to better understand our phenomenon. First ly in both cases it is an intentional act of consciousness, which means that they never occur simultaneously. If I understand, I can't imagine, if I can imagine, I can't understand. The object of perception consists of an infinite multiplicity of determinations and possible relationships. On the contrary, the most determined image has but a finite number of determinations, precisely those of which we are aware.

In other words, we can say that the author reserves to the imaginative consciousness a creative role (active) and perceptual consciousness, on the contrary, a role of apprehension (passive). That's why Sartre says there's nothing in the image that's no longer put in the act of imagining. Whereas in perception there is always something I can grasp that was not yet put. Thus the imaginative consciousness has an active role because it is a "spontaneity that produces and preserves the object as an image". This causes perceptual consciousness to appear as passive in the face of the perceived object. However, these assumptions are fundamental to understand what Sartre means by imaginary, because for the author this type of consciousness has an unreresothing function.

This means that the imaginary is the place in which consciousness creates the unreal as denial of the real. But wouldn't that imply the acceptance of imaginative consciousness as the place of a certain form of alienation? Yes and no, therefore, if on the one hand it can be appropriated as a form of escape from the real by bad faith, on the other hand it can only be constituted against the background of the real constituted, "the nadification [...] always implies that it is constituted in the world."

Therefore, says Sartre: It is the situation-in-the-world, seized as a concrete and individual reality of consciousness, that serves as a motivation for the constitution of any

5 SARTRE, The Imaginary, p. 20.
unreal object, and the nature of this unreal object is circumscribed by this motivation. Thus, to understand the imaginative consciousness as an act means to rescue its role as a devious of unprecedented instances of the real itself, is to rescue its fundamental presupposition which is the phenomenological notion of intentionality as conceived by the French interpretation of Sartorian existentialism. Therefore, more than a facilitator in the process of apprehension of conceptual contents proclaimed by the normative lotus discourse, metaphor should be understood as a creative instance of human reality itself.

In other words, the unreal presented (constructed) by fictional creation more than figuring (representing) the real is responsible for its transfiguration. The unreal is produced by the real and at the same time is a producer of human reality. Thus, the fundamental question that subexists to this reflection is: how is it possible to measure the role of the imaginary in the constitution of what we call the real? Or before, but what's real anyway? Thus, the hermeneutic prerogative arises to what we propose, that is, that about the conflict of interpretations.

In view of the above we understand that art should play a central role within this process, evident that this implies a reformulation of the educational model inherited from our technicist tradition. Then we arrive at our fundamental hypothesis: what does it mean to seek to opportunize moments with problems, guide questions and observation of phenomena in a meaningful learning? If our hypothesis is correct, learning is only meaningful when creative. Thus, against a conforming pedagogy, deforming, which conditions rather than freeing, we must effectively abandon the traditional model and seek mechanisms to potentiate an education that is effectively liberating.

True understanding requires the active participation of the one who learns. We only truly know something when we actively participate in the process of its (re)construction, when we employ our freedom to and in the production of knowledge. In this sense, Paulo Freire's speech perfectly summarizes our position: "No one releases anyone, and no one is freed alone. Liberation takes place in communion, or if you prefer, in the encounter." However, if the learning process requires the active participation of both the educator and the student, then, if Sartre is right when he says that it is through the use of the imaginary that man makes use of his freedom, it is through the appeal to the image and the imaginary that the learning process must be guided.

Let us quickly remember some of Paulo Freire's ideas: Under the influence of the philosophical school of pragmatism, the Pedagogy of Autonomy presents as one of its fundamental assumptions the understanding of the pedagogical process as an active
teaching-learning practice. Added to the dialogue developed by Paulo Freire with the phenomenology framework, his proposal proclaims a contextualized pedagogy, which implies the necessary politicization of the educational process.

This means, first, that the information that does not take into account the context in which it is inserted, which is not cognitively related to the daily use that results from it, is not effective as acquired knowledge. Thus, when disjointed from concrete experience, knowledge becomes an anomaly that instead of releasing, imprisons. Let us also remember Freire when he says that reading the world precedes the reading of the word world, that is, that relationship between the real and the representation of the real by the language proposed by Nietzsche mentioned earlier, according to Freire, has as substrate the real itself.

When the representation arises the real was already there to condition it. Hence that speech is never neutral, it takes an active exercise to understand what conditions it. In Sartre the image is an active instance, the place of creation and freedom, therefore, a privileged place for the establishment of a model of education that does not neglect the creator páthos required in the Nietzschean reflections that served as an initial motto. We believe then in a liberating pedagogy, that is, in a model of education [human formation] that does not neglect this fundamental assumption that the starting point should always be student subjectivity, its way of being in the world, its historical situation, or if preferred, its social reality.

We return to our point, what is the real (reality) without the mediation of the imaginary? And if through the imaginary, as Sartre wants, I have to actively put myself in the process of constitution of human reality, and yet, if it is only through creation that meaningful learning takes place, then would a pedagogical model not be justified centered on the resource of the problem of investigation, of the fundamental question, of the formulation of hypotheses to the imaginary? Is it not, therefore, necessary to seek mechanisms that make this process liberating? Strictly speaking, if we follow this reflection so far, we will realize that the metaphor is no longer configured as a mediator, but rather as a creative instance. It is a fundamental part of the pedagogical process and human formation, however, it is not limited to mediating conceptual contents, at the limit it is the result of the situation in the world and, at the same time, a creative part of human reality.

Therefore, it is through the use of the study of the phenomenon, in the formulation of research problems, hypotheses, justifications, objectives proposed in understanding the
imaginary and the image that authentic knowledge is constituted. When Arendt asserts that the essence of education is birth, it does nothing but turn our eyes to the fact that education exists only because new singular beings come into the world and, rather than train them to survive as living organisms, education has the task of presenting them to the world, developing critical citizens, leading them to enjoy this legacy and making them understand that the achievements of men constitute it as it is. There is no way to manufacture human beings responsible for this space, or any other type of pre-established subject. The formation of each human being does not equate to the manufacturing process of an object. We do not mold a person like homo faber gives definite form to a table, because in educational activity we relate to other people, other singular beings, and not to violent raw materials of nature, as in the case of wood. In this sense, summarizing the educational activity to the development of skills and competences for the labor market would not be an attempt to reduce the exercise of understanding the human world? And by proposing an examination of the essence of education, would Arendt not be indicating to us that the principles in which we educate our children and young people are gradually being degraded in purposes?

Of course, more than answering these questions, we bring them up as a way of provoking new reflections. What we can say is that, in the face of such questions, philosophy and the humanities in general assume an extremely relevant role. Fundamentally, because they still allow a disconnection of their contents - often considered as "unproductive" from the point of view of the labor market - from a utilitarian logic, in which the question prevails: what is it for? Therefore, it seems clear and evident to us that the effort to educate children and young people, to get them to take responsibility for our world, is an act in which the end itself cannot be guaranteed. After all, we cannot be sure what each of them will become and what actions they will take when and if, then, familiar with the world. The commitment to education, we can say, is more like an early confidence, a commitment to something that we still do not know the end.

This view differs from the vision of training of increasingly conscious, inquiring, critical citizens, having full development of their skills and abilities. What is now known are teachers who repeat the subject until the student "learns", others ask students to write texts but if it wants to give you the pleasure of reading such constructs, others ask every class that students answer exercises from the notebook and at the end of the year who did the exercises takes "10.0".
But how can the world at the wheel of philosophy be so as to mark this beginning experience? For philosophy to happen it is necessary to question itself, it is through the questions that the journey through thought begins. "Philosophy as an experience is precisely a journey or a journey through thought through questions." (KOHAN, 2013). Perhaps the answers are not of crucial importance at this point, because what we are discussing here is this experience at first, over and over again, and it is the question (question) that seems to have this power. Thus each question can represent a new beginning, because each question has the potential to be the meeting point to set off on another crossing, on a new trip.  

However, it is not about outside questions, but about putting yourself in question. That is, it is a question of asking what worries us, what bothers us, bothers us in the sense of making us think. As if the inestit being so great within us that it no longer fits and we need to say, in this case, ask, so that we can empty ourselves and become light. But it is not only with the questions that philosophy is asked, the question has the character of opening paths to be traveled, as if we were in the middle of the river and each question opened the way to a new direction.

We can remark in this passage that Kohan admits that one cannot philosophise alone. For this thinking to happen it is necessary to launch the issues that concern us, in a movement of exposure. Be it our questions, questions from others or from the very history of philosophy. It is necessary to read, kohan says, we would say that reading has an almost sense of empathy. Apart from what you ask, what she might mean by that. For example, reading the questions, we would say that it means understanding what is beyond the question itself, such as the statements it proposes. Philosophising happens in the form of dialogue, it is about bringing others into dialogue.

Unlike a debate, dialogue does not presuppose firm arguments so that we can convince the other, but it is an activity that we do with others, without the intention of convincing. The arguments must be firm and the examples clear to make our thinking

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clearer. We could say that while the question paves the way, dialogue runs through it. Way we can come and go, change and redo routes according to how it goes on.

For this it is necessary to take care, to take care in the sense of knowing how to wait, to have patience. Take care of the questions, the answers, the words to be said, the students who are thinking with us. But we also need to listen, open ears, stay in a listening position. Therefore, it is necessary to keep an eye out. Attentive to our habits, to the places we circulate, to what we think, but also attentive to the things of the world, as others think. Thought that can manifest itself through what we speak, what we write and the way we act. We must be attentive to ourselves and to the world. It is interesting to realize that Kohan employs verbs in the infinitive, perhaps he does so to remark the dimension of action of philosophy. Philosophy in this sense is understood as doing, as a philosopher.

We can do philosophy with the very history of philosophy, with philosophy as long as we know, theory. Thus, philosophy as a theory is easily reconciled with philosophy as action, with philosophy. We do philosophine with philosophy, but also with others. We philosophise with our students, with those who share a world with us. We philosophise by sharing and thinking our questions.

To philosophise it is necessary to suspend our knowledge of you and the world. This is necessary so that we can think of other meanings and possibilities for life. Now, how could we be aware of the surprise of something we already know what it is? How could we open up possibilities and senses by limiting them in previous knowledge? It is about putting our knowledge in parentheses and keep an eye on life without second thoughts, without applying previous knowledge loaded with certainty.

Thus we can say that philosophy forms childhoods, not in the chronological sense, but in the qualitative sense. It makes it possible for us to experience the world as if it were the first time. But this formation is always called into question, because it is a question of also being called into question at all times, the identity crisis is to see in philosophy, so that we are always suspending knowledge about themselves and the world.

But also philosophy as experience can keep in shape the one who practices it. The exercise of thought, the questioning, the thinking of the question, rehearsing the possibilities of answering them keeps us in shape. It gives us form and in this sense, to the extent that we practice philosophy we gain the form of philosopher. Like the one who is always exercising his attention on himself and the world. We have thus seen the concept of formation that consists of transforming ourselves from our confrontation with the world by suspending and desecrated our relations with him, but also attentive to what he
tells us. However, training can also be understood as taking shape and we take shape as we exercise.

The same character is found in Kohan when he approaches the exercise of attention, which is thinking, and which is strengthened in the exercise itself. So that the philosopher is strengthened in the philosopher itself. On the other hand, childhood approaches in its qualitative dimension, how to experience the world as if it were the first time. The formative character of philosophy consists in strengthening our attention on the one hand, keeping us in shape and on the other to transform ourselves into childhood, while experiencing the possibilities and meanings of life as if it were the first time.

Here we already have a first point to propose for the formative role of philosophy for its teaching, more specifically, for the training of philosophy teachers. A philosophy professor must overcome the remnants of an old dichotomy that said that a philosophy teacher (a graduate) is less of a researcher than a bachelor. By proposing that a philosophy teacher has to be a researcher who problematizes his own philosophical background and who builds his teaching practice, Cerletti clearly tells us that the divisions between research and teaching, bachelor and bachelor, theory and practice, are not his problems.

And right now, it also gives us a serene freedom. After all, in our case, we have already begun to ask ourselves: how to think of the formative role of philosophy if we take it as a philosophical creation? To some of Cerletti's statements in his work about this. If the above quote makes it clear that there would be as many teaching methods as existing philosophies. However, Cerletti himself puts us what he understands to be a formative role, perhaps saying a little about his choices.

The author says that "a course should be an environment in which conditions can be created for the formulation of philosophical questions" (CERLETTI, 2009, p.21). That is, for the Argentine, philosophical questions are important to characterize a philosophy class because the questions put us two fundamental characteristics: first "the philosophical question is then the fundamental constitutive element of philosophy and, therefore, of teaching philosophy" (CERLETTI, 2009, p.21) and also that it is very different to 'explain' the answers that, in a determined historical and cultural context, a philosopher gave himself, than the students and the teacher try to appropriate the questions of this philosopher, so that these answers become also answers to their own problems (CERLETTI, 2009, p. 20).

That is, through these two quotations we can observe how Cerletti poses the question of a certain ability of philosophy and the relationship we have to have with the history of philosophy. With regard to this second point, I would also highlight another posture he has placed that seemed quite interesting to us: it would be feasible to identify, then, two aspects or dimensions that are intertwined in teaching/learning philosophy: a dimension that, with some caution, we would call 'objective' (historical information, philosophical sources, texts of commentators, etc.) and another 'subjective' (the novelty of what philosophical: their appropriation of sources, their re-creation of problems, their reading of the past, etc.) (2009, p.33) What interested us was the fact that the teaching process learning philosophy doubled, it has a subjective dimension of self-formation and renewal of philosophical issues by those who objectify objectively of philosophical texts and their contexts and commentators would be feasible to identify, then, two aspects or dimensions that intertwine in teaching/learning philosophy: a dimension that, with some caution, we would call 'objective' (historical information, philosophical sources, commentators' texts, etc.) and another 'subjective' (the novelty of what philosophism: its appropriation of sources, its re-creation of problems, its reading of the past, etc.). (2009, p.33) What interested us was the fact that the teaching process learning philosophy doubled, it has a subjective dimension of self-formation and renewal of philosophical issues by those who objectify philosophical texts and their contexts and commentators.

Deleuze had a particular way of putting problems intensified by motivating questions: a "why?", repeated numerous times, and "what does that mean?", seem to instigate the public to wait for the arrival of a concept or a problem. These questions are also effects of Deleuze's performance when he wants to make his audience a witness to philosophical creation, as if speech were a vocalization of thinking by reviving the process of creation of such or what concept.  

In addition to these specificities of the dominant model, scientific knowledge is thus constituted according to its epistemological and methodological bases, which makes it causal, due to its search for the question "what is the cause of this phenomenon?" and excludes the question "what is the purpose of this phenomenon?", with the rupture with vulgar knowledge, which uses the cause and intention; makes it timeless and static, due to its functionality independent of these variants; aspires to the formulation of laws,

according to the patterns observed in the phenomena, to predict the situations in which they occur.

From the static and eternal characteristics of modern science and Cartesian rationalism, identified through the decomposition of the elements in the parts that constitute it as the idea of the machine world, the universal hypothesis of the modern era, Mechanism, was created. The Mechanistic determinism gave a functionalist and utilitarian character to knowledge, preferring a dominating and transformative view, that deep knowledge of reality. At the social level, the bourgeoisie assumed Comte's positivist socialism that guaranteed them the dominance of the final state of human evolution, Spencer's industrial society, and Durkheim's organic solidarity.

To be human is to be a rehearsal. More than hits we bring mistakes and many questions. With the rescue of curricular orientation it is suggested that there is an objective in the teaching of philosophy that would be close to the development of "research skills, reasoning, analysis, interpretation of texts [...], aiming at the construction and or deconstruction of concepts about reality".

Reflecting is the mark of philosophical attitude. Turning to reality critically, with the purpose of seeing it clearly, with comprehensiveness and depth, not to settle for deceptive appearances, to ward off prejudices, to seek new angles of look. To transform one's own gaze. We need to philosophise: think as far as we can and farther than we know. For what purpose? A more humane, more lucid, more serene, more rational, happier, freer life.

4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is important to ask: how to evaluate the circumstances? What criteria define what is beneficial or evil for the humanization of the human being? What's a good human again? What is good human formation? The initial question broadens: not only what is human formation, but what is good human formation. This refers to the basic anthropological question: what is the human? Working philosophically on this issue is one of the main contributions of Philosophy to Education. The main question is what concerns the human being and the meaning of his existence.

I imagine that philosophy seeks an accurate attitude: to ask. And ask, not to immediately find answers. Ask for answers to be given and ask questions about the answers that have been given again. It is never giving up the critical attitude, knowing that it is a wretched attitude, to the extent that we will never have the advantage that, on
a ship, it has a map, a compass, all electronic devices, so that the pilot can even sleep and the ship goes alone to its destination. The idea of assuming to the end a critical thought is to accept that we sail without a map, without compass, at most perhaps with a star and that this star is: keep asking.

Philosophy, as experience and effort of thought/rethinking of the world, in the continuous dynamics of studying/learning, asking/building possibilities of answers, can help to rethink the classroom space and the university/school space. These do not provide the establishment of a pedagogical agreement, negotiated, in which teachers and undergraduates can effectively interact, in the formatting of their school life. Isn't educating, before, to form? How is it possible to train teachers with a renewed mindset if we do not provide effective experiences of participation? How to work philosophy in an aseptic environment?

The philosophical attitude towards knowledge and education, addressing the concept of philosophy and the decision not to accept the obvious in relation to things, ideas, facts, values, situations and behaviors of everyday existence. There is talk of philosophical attitude and its action of asking, asking what, why and for what of phenomena.

Finally, it is concluded that the question is the north, the compass, the propellant spring, *the lever, the Start*, the restlessness, the obstacle to be solved. May we find teachers who ask their students to ask and thus train citizens ready to question, believe, doubt... finally, to be a human who is not robotic and manipulated, but rather an opinion-strainer who knows his rights and duties.
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